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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 15-2625 
________________ 
 
HAIYAN LI, 
        Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
        Respondent 
________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the  
Board of Immigration Appeals  
(Agency No. A087-755-608) 
Immigration Judge: Honorable Judge Rosalind K. Malloy 
 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 11, 2016 
 
Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge, AMBRO, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: March 21, 2016) 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge. 
                                                          
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding 
precedent.  
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 Haiyan Li petitions for review of a final order of removal because the Immigration 
Judge relied upon an exhibit that was not officially part of the record and the Bureau of 
Immigration Appeals adopted the IJ’s decision.  According to Li, the record did not allow 
for meaningful review and the IJ improperly took judicial notice of country conditions in 
China. Li asks us to remand the BIA’s decision back to the IJ. For reasons discussed 
below, we will deny petition for review. 
I.  
 Li, a native of Fujian Province of the People’s Republic of China, entered the 
United States without inspection in October 2009. In 2010, the Department of Homeland 
Security issued a Notice to Appear, charging Li with removability under Immigration and 
Nationality Act  § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) as an alien present in the United States without being 
admitted or paroled. Li conceded removability. She then filed an application for asylum, 
withholding of removal and protection under the United Nations Convention Against 
Torture Act (“CAT”), alleging she was harmed in China as a result of her participation in 
an underground church and fear that she would be persecuted if she returned to China due 
to her belief in Christianity and punished for leaving China illegally. 
 The Immigration Judge determined that even if Li was credible, she failed to 
establish that she suffered past persecution or had a well-founded fear of future 
persecution to meet her burden of proof for asylum. The IJ also determined that Li failed 
to establish that she would be singled out for persecution or that there is a pattern or 
practice of persecution of persons similarly situated. The IJ then denied Li’s request for 
withholding of removal, because her rejection of Li’s asylum claim applies equally to the 
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denial of Li’s request for withholding of removal. Finally, the IJ found that Li did not 
establish eligibility for protection under the CAT because the record failed to show that 
she was more likely than not to be subjected to torture “by or with the acquiescence” or 
willful blindness of government officials upon her removal to China.1 
 The Board of Immigration Appeals adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision and this 
petition for review followed.  
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). To the extent that the BIA 
issued its own opinion, we review its decision rather than the IJ’s.2 However, we look to 
the decision of the IJ to the extent that the BIA deferred to or adopted the IJ’s reasoning.3 
We “uphold the findings of the BIA to the extent that they are supported by reasonable, 
substantial and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole[.]”4   
  In her brief, Li argues that the IJ erred because an unmarked exhibit, entitled 
“Report for the Dep’t of Justice, ‘China: Penalties for Home Church Gatherings,’” was 
not attached to the IJ’s decision, even though the IJ relied on the exhibit to determine that 
there was no pattern or practice of persecution of unregistered Christians in China. Li 
then argues that the IJ committed a due process violation when she took judicial notice of 
the unmarked exhibit without giving Li notice and an opportunity to respond, which 
resulted in depriving her, and this Court, of an opportunity to review the exhibits. 
However, Li failed to raise any such challenges before the BIA.  We may review a final 
                                                          
1 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.18(a)(1); Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 182-83 
(3d Cir. 2003). 
2 Li v. Att’y Gen., 400 F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 2005). 
3 Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 515 (3d Cir. 2006).   
4 Kayembe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 231, 234 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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order of the BIA “only if ... the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available 
to the alien as of right.”5 The exhaustion requirement attaches to each particular issue 
raised by the petitioner.6 A petitioner’s failure to exhaust an issue by presenting it to the 
BIA deprives us of jurisdiction to consider that issue.7  Thus, we cannot now review Li’s 
due process challenge.8   
III. 
 Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review. 
 
                                                          
5 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). 
6 Lin v. Att'y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 120 & n. 6 (3d Cir. 2008). 
7 Id. at 120–21; Hua Wu v. Att'y Gen., 571 F.3d 314, 317 (3d Cir. 2009). 
8 Castro v. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 356, 365 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[T]he exhaustion requirement 
attaches to each particular issue raised by the petitioner. A petitioner’s failure to exhaust 
an issue by presenting it to the [Board] deprives us of jurisdiction to consider that issue.” 
(citation omitted)); Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 447-48 (3d Cir. 2005) (failure 
to argue procedural due process claims to the Board is “fatal to our jurisdiction”). 
 
